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THE PUBLIC POLICY OF CONTRACTS TO WILL FUTURE
ACQUIRED PROPERTY
T HE general subject of .wills upon consideration seems to have
given courts and jurists a good deal of trouble, not only in
England and America, but also in the. continental countries. The
Code Napoleon appears in terms actually to prohibit the making of
reciprocal or mutual wills in the same instrument.'
This has been copied in the Spanish Civil Code of 1889,2 and
transferred thence into the Porto Rican Code.3 This provision of
the Code Napoleon appears in the Louisiana Civil Code also.4  In
each of these cases, however, the prohibition seems to be aimed
simply at the form of the will; i. e., the making of a reciprocal or
joint will in the same instrument, the penalty for the violation of
which would be the nullity of the instrument as a will, 5 leaving open
the question as to what legal value it might have, if any. That this
is the interpretation put upon Article 1572 (1565) of the Louisiana
Civil Code by the courts of Louisiana is quite evident from the sev-
eral decisions on the subject of joint or reciprocal wills.
In the case of Bernard Heirs v. Soule," it was held that a reciprocal
will by a husband and wife, with provision for the remainder over,
if any, to the heirs of -both at the death of the survivor, conveyed
absolute ownership to the wife on the death of the husband. The
question as to the effect of the prohibition of reciprocal or joint
wills in Art. 1572 (1565) was not brought up in the case, probably
because the property had vested in the wife in i79o, some years
before the adoption of the Louisiana Civil Code of i8o8, which, had
borrowed this provision from the Code Napoleon. In the case of
Oreline v. Heirs of Haggerty,7 the will of John Haggerty was
declared null and void because it was contrary to Art. 1565, there
being incorporated in the same instrument the will of his wife. In
Wood et al. v. Roane,8 it was decided that where the will of the hus-
band and the will of the wife, or those of any two persons, *are written
out by the same party on the same day, in favor of the same ben-
2 Un testament ne pourra Etre fait dans le mame acte par deux ou plusleurs personnes,
"soit au profit d'un tiers, soit a titre de disposition r6ciproque et muteuelle. Cod. Nap. 968.
.See Cod. Civ. 669.
.s R. Civ. Code, 667.
4
La. Civ. Code 1573 (x565). RECIPROCAL OR MUTUAL TESTAMENTS PROHIIBITED. A
testament can not be made by the same act, by two or more persons, either for the ben-
efit of a third person, or under the title of a reciprocal or mutual disposition.
5 Cf. Cod. Nap. 1oo1, 1097.
6 (1841), 18 La. 21.'
S0i857), x2 La. Ann. 88o.
a (1883), 35 La. Ann. 865.
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eficiary, and are presented by the testators separately to the required
number of witnesses with the proper statement, at different times
though on the same day, they constitute two disconnected, distinct,
and independent acts, and are not amenable to the prohibitions
contained in Art. 1572 (T565) of the Civil Code.
It is evident that neither of these cases gives us any light on the
question as to how a testament made on consideration of a reciprocal
testament or for other consideration, would be treated by the courts.
In the case of Fuselier v. Masse,9 the plaintiff claimed all the prop-
erty of which the father and wife [the plaintiff's stepmother] died
possessed in virtue of a notarial act, by which they adopted him as
their child. This act appears to have been executed before the com-
mandant of Opelousas on the first of June, 1799. The parties declare
that not having children by their marriage * * * they
adopt the father's natural son Pierre, with all the rights which that
quality can confer on him; and that they institute him their only and
universal heir after their death, of all their present and future prop-
erty; only requiring in return that he will assist them and not
abandon them for the remainder of their lives. This instrument was
revoked as to the wife's share by a subsequent will of the wife.
There was an attempt to show that the donation was made on certain
conditions, and that the donee had performed them, but the evidence
was held insufficient to establish the contention of the plaintiff, and
the devisees of the wife were given her share of the property. It is
manifest that we have here a contract to leave all present and future
acquired property, on consideration of the son's promise to care for
the adoptive parent until her death, and that it fail6 as a contract
because of the. failure of the plaintiff to prove that consideration was
actually executed. When an alleged contract to will all came thus
squarely into conflict with a subsequent testament attempting a
revocation of the contractual instrument, the will prevailed, not
because of the superior strength of the testamentary instrument as
such but because the compact lacked one of the essential elements of
a perfect contract.
In connection with these cases from Roman-American law a case
may be noted, which arising in Roman-Dutch jurisdiction (Cape of
Good Hope), was transferred thence to the English Privy Council. 0
A mutual will had been made by a husband and wife and, after
the death of the husband, the wife attempted to revoke it so far as
it affected her property. The Privy Council held that unless she
had elected to take under the mutual will her revocation was good.
The higher court was led to this conclusion in spite of the decision
9 (1832), 4 .- 423.
10 Denyssen v. Mostert (1872), L. R. 4, P. C. 236.
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in Dufour v. Pereira"l because this seemed to be firmly established
Dutch law. The court says "Bynkershoek, indeed, speaks with
strong disapprobation of abuses of the law, not infrequent in his
time, whereby one co-testator, whose testamentary dispositions had
been the consideration of those of the other, revoked his part of the
will without communicating with his co-testator; but Bynkershoek
treats the right to do this by law as clear, nor can it be doubted that
that great judge and jurist would have deemed himself bound to give
effect to the law as he had laid it down, whatever may have been
his opinion of its policy. Their Lordships have but one duty-to
declare what they deem to be the law." The well established prin-
ciple of Dutch law followed in this decision was that "adiation or
reception of benefits is treated as one of the conditions without which
a surviving spouse is not deprived of the power of revocation."
Since the widow hd not elected to take under the will she might
repudiate by subsequent will, after the death of her husband, the
agreement in the mutual will.
In the early English cases there seems to be a wavering of opinion
on the part of the courts as to whether joint wills, either for mutual
benefit of the parties or for a third party, could be considered as
wills at all; with, of course, varying decisions as to what force
such instruments should have, if they were denied validity as wills. 12
The mental confusion of the courts in the earlier cases seems to
depend on the fact that they put testament and contract in opposition
to each other, and either explicitly argue or subconsciously feel that
the two can not exist together. A will is a unilateral juristic act,
a contract is essentially bilateral. The essence of a will is its revoca-
bility at the desire or whim of its maker, a contract is irrevocable by
one of the parties. The legality of a will depends upon its form; of a
contract, upon the consideration. Then further, while an instru-
ment fulfilling all the characteristics of a will might be made jointly,
the joint operation. of the wills of the two parties incorporated in
the document would be conditioned on the very great improbability,
amounting to a practical impossibility of the deaths of the two parties
happening at the same instant. It is this feeling of the legal incom-
patibility of a will and a contract that seems to be back of the state-
ments of the courts in Damrliington v. Pidtnze,, 3 to the effect that
"there can not be a joint will," and in Hobsonr v. Blackburn ' 4 that
11 Cf. infra Notes is and 48.
12 See the historical note by Bigelow, in Jarman, Wills, Ed. 6, Vol. 1, p. 27, Note 1.
Also an elaborate note by C. V. Conrad on Contracts Limiting Disposition of Property
by Vill, Law Reg. XXXIII, pp. 32-4o, and an article by Mary M. Bartelme on Contracts
to Make Wills, Law Reg. XXXIII, pp. 721-728.
13 (1775), 1 Cowp. 268.
14 (1822), 1 Addams 274.
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"an instrument of this nature [a mutual or conjoint will] is unknown
to the testamentary law of this country." The subsequent cases
that follow these as precedents simply repeat their reasoning on the
intrinsic antagonism of the two concepts.15
In the line of cases upholding the joint or mutual wills, begin-
ning in the middle of the eighteenth century, 16 the decisions all
rest upon the assumption that when the will and the contract come
into conflict, the latter must prevail, and the variations in the findings,
if they appear at all, depend upon the nature of the contract itself or
its method of enforcement. If the terms of the agreement are clear,
certain and fair, it will be enforced as a contract and the method of
its enforcement will depend not upon the testamentary character of
the instrument but upon its contractual nature. In other words, the
statements in the older English decisions about the invalidity of
mutual or joint wills mean just what the provision in the continental
-odes upon the subject mean; namely, that while documents purporting
to be joint or mutual wills may be unenforceable as testaments they
may be enforced as contracts, if they meet contractual requirements.
"The unsettled state of the law in regard to joint and mutual wills
and contracts to make wills" spoken of in some comparatively recent
cases or recent text-books17 does not exist in any such general sense
as was one time the case, and the attempt will be made in the further
progress of this paper to show that the few minor points in this field as
to which the courts are still in apparent conflict, may be settled by
further progress along the logical line that has been followed in the
past.
The two points upon which the courts are still in conflict are: (I)
Is a contract to will all property [future acquired as well as presently
held] valid? (2) To what extent will the Statute of Frauds inter-
fere with the operation .of such contracts? This question usually
presents ftself in one of two forms: (a) What is sufficient part-
performance by the plaintiff to take the case out of the statute? (b)
Is a will such a writing as will satisfy the statute?18
The contracts to will all seem to have been called in question for
reasons similar to those that in the earlier litigation made contracts
to will simply of doubtful expediency, but they have been decided
15 See the discussion of Hershey -. Clark, post; and Clayton v. Liverman (1837), 2
Dcv. and Bat. 558; reversed in In re Sutton Davis's will (x897), 120 N. C. 9.
16 Cf. Dufour v. Pereira (1769), r Dick. 4r9. Isard v,. Middleton (785), 1 Desau
(S. C.) sS, is sometimes quoted as sanctioning mutual wills, but the mutual agreement
to make wills was not enforced in that case because of lack of sufficient proof. The
case depends upon the Statute of Frauds, as is shown by the citation in Turnipseed v.
Sirrine (1899), 57 S. C. 577.
17 Cf. Schouler, Wills, § 457.
'$The first question will be discussed in the present'paper, reserving the consideration
of the second question for a later issue.
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usually in accordance with the general principles of contract. An
agreement to make mutual wills of all property held by the contract-
ing parties has been declared good in New York and Arizona 9 simply
because they were good as contracts. They have been held bad in
New York, in District of Columbia and in Texas,20 f6r the reason
that the contract as such was not adequately proved. The contract to
will all may be implied.2 1 Such contracts have been denied validity
because of lack of certainty in their terms in New York, Pennsyl-
vania, South Carolina and Missouri.2 2 In the case of Ripson v. Hart,
the court, by DUNWELL, J., does to be sure say that such a contract
has not been supported by the courts of equity in New York because
"it permits deceased to possess, control and absolutely dispose of his
property so as to divest himself of all title thereto, during his life if
he saw fit, leaving it uncertain whether he would have any property
at his death." The case, however, was not decided on the score of its
uncertainty in any such general sense, but because of its specific
uncertainty arising from the fact that the evidence was not sufficient
to establish the contract. On the other hand, the courts of South
Carolina and of Indiana have upheld the validity of contracts of a
character identical with those above cited which were, however, cer-
tain in their terms and proved by sufficient evidence.22
The evidential value of the fact of possession by the promisee as
proof of the agreement has the same value in the contracts to will all
as in ordinary contracts; i. e., the fact of possession is evidence of
part performance of parol agreement to leave real estate.2 4
The difficulty in acknowledging the validity of contracts to will
all seems to have been more prominent in those cases in which dis-
position was made of future acquired as well as of presently held
property, but the tendency of the decisions is prponouncedly in
favor of such contracts.
2 5
"Everdell v. Hill (1899), 58 N. Y. Supp. 447; Eldred v. Warner (1875), 1 Ariz. 175.
20 Edson -m Parsons (898), 55 N. Y. 555; Coveney v. Conlin (r9o2), 20 App. D. C.
308; vyche v. Clapp (1875), 43 Tex. 245.
21Burdine v. Burdine (igoo), 98 W. Va. 515; Teske v. Dittberner (1903), 70 Neb.
544, 98 N. V. 57; 'Wright v. Wright (1894), 99 Mich. 170, 23 L. R. A. '96, 58 N. NV. 54;
Edson v. Parsons, supra.
22 Ripson v. Hart (igoi), 64 N. Y. App. Div. 593; Wilson v. Heath (1898), 23 Misc.
714; In re Eldred's Estate (igoo), 9 Pa. Dis. R. 420; McKegan v. O'Neil (884), 22
S. C. 454; Steele v. Steele (igoi), 16r Mo. 566.
3Bruce v. Moon (i9o0), 57 S. C. 60, 35 S. E. 415; Garard v. Yeager (goo), 154
Ind. 253; Cf. also Sutton v. Hayden, 62 Mo. 1o.
24 Best v. Grolapp (1904), 96 N. W. 641; (Nebraska) affirmed on rehearing 99 N. W.
837; Leonardson v. Hulin (z887), 64 Mich. x; McCabe v. Healy (i9o2), x38 Cal. 87,
70 Pac. xoo8; Schmitt v. Missionary Society (1886), 4r N. J. Eq. 115, 3 At. 398; Sutton
v. Hayden (1876), 66 Mo. ioi; Tuilt v. Smith (189o), 137 Pa. St. 35, 2o AtL 579.
25Hanly v. Hanly (19o5), 93 N. Y. Supp. 864, 1o5 App. D. 335; Heath v. Heath
(x896), 42 N. Y. Supp. xo87, 18 Misc. Rep. 521; Johannes v. Martin (z897), 48 N. Y.
Supp. 102, 22 App. Div. 561; In re Wescott, 54 N. Y. Supp. 545, 34 App. Div. 239;
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The Minnesota court in the case of Kleeberg v. Shrader, supra
(Note 25), went so far as to say that under a contract to dispose of
all of an estate remaining at the death of the promisor, personal
property to which she became entitled after the making of such con-
tract will pass, though not distributed at the time of her death nor in
contemplation of the parties when the contract was made. The
Pennsylvania court, in the case of In re Lewallen's Estate, supra,
(Note 25), held that a contract should be enforced, by which a father
agreed to will all to his daughters on consideration of their giving
up their interest in their mother's estate. On the other hand, the
cases in which the courts have refused to enforce contracts to leave
subsequently acquired property have really been decided on some
other score than the unadvisability of binding the contracting parties
in regard to future acquisitions. For example the case of Austin v.
Davi 6 goes off on a question involving the Statute of Frauds.
Emery v. Burbank27 in a similar-manner involves the Massachusetts
Statute of Wills. The Missouri court in the case of Davis v. Hen-
dricks2' holds an alleged contract of this nature unenforceable, but
simply because of failure of evidence to prove the contract.
In the practical decision of hard cases; i. e., cases in which there
is a conflict between previously enunciated law or its logical appli-
cation and the feeling of what is just under the particular circum-
stances, the courts of the present day are apt to invoke the deus
ex inachina of "public policy" just as those of a past generation
appealed to "natural law," and it may be worth while to examine
the cases in detail in which "public policy" has been called to the
aid of the courts, to determine, if possible, whether the decisions
may be put on some less equivocal basis.
One of the strongest cases holding that the contract to will all
is unobjectionable is the recent case of Howe v. WVatson. 2  A
voman 85 years old offered in writing to give her sister all the
property she would leave at her decease, if the sister and her
daughter would come and stay with her during the remainder of
her life. The younger sister accepted, and came with her daughter
from Florida to Massachusetts. They stayed with thd older sister
until her death which occurred only thirty-eight hours after their
In re Lewallen's Estate (19o5), 27 Pa. Sup. Ct. 320; Kleeberg v. Shrader (1897), 72
N. V. (Minn.) s5; Svanberg v. Fosseen (1899), 75 Mi,~n. 350, 78 N. W. 4; Laird v.
Vila (2904), oo N. V. (Minn.) 656; Nowack v. Berger, 133 Mo. 24. 34 S. V. Rep. 489.
3z L. R. A. 8zo; Kofka v. Rosicky (1894), 41 Neb. 328, 59 N. W. 788. 25 L. R. A. 2o7:
Whiton v. Whiton (T899), x79 Ill. 32, 53 N. E. 722.
20 128 Ind. 473.
27 168 Mass. 326.
2 99 Mo. 478.
(0 oigor), r79 Mass. 30.
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arrival. She died intestate, leaving real property to the amount
of about $4,ooo and personalty to the amount of about $2,ooo. The
court held that this contract was fair and equitable in all respects,
and specific performance of the contract was allowed in spite of
the impossibility of mutuality in the enforcement of that right, owing
to the death of one of the parties, on the principle that actual per-
formance is as good as an obligation to perform. There is no hint
in the opinion of the court in this case that the enforcement of such
a contract is in any particular contrary to public policy, but the posi-
tive statement that "it is competent for a party to stipulate for the
disposition of his property at the time of his decease." The same
court had gone even further in Krell v. Codman" saying there that
the enforcement of such a covenant under seal, though without con-
sideration "is not contrary to the policy of our laws." 31 The Ala-
bama court32 says there is "nothing repugnant to public policy"
in a written instrument purporting to be a will by which deced-
ent agreed to pass all her property to the plaintiffs "in consider-
ation of past and future treatinent." The New York court s
attempted to avoid this bugaboo of public policy, in a case where the
intestate with the consent of his wife had entered into an agreement
to make the child of a widow his heir and to "give him the same
interest which a son would have in whatever property he owned or
might have at the time of his decease." Intestate had no children
or descendants living at his death. The court in deciding this case
said that this contract was "not obnoxious to the criticism that it
was against public policy," because as a matter of fact it did not
require the decedent to give all his property to the plaintiff to the
exclusion of his own children. There was a like implied argument
against the public policy of such contracts in the case of Ripson v.
Hart, supra, but the case went off on another point.
The cases of Owens v. McNally and Hershey v. Clark34 are ordi-
narily quoted35 as denying the validity of contracts to will all prop-
erty to be held at the death of the decedent, but a careful exam-
ination of these cases shows that the first can hardly be quoted as
authority for this proposition, and in the second case the argument
of the court is based on some of the older cases, in which the logical
30 (x891), 354 Mass. 457.
Ut Cf. also jenkin v. Stetson (z864), 9 Allen (Mass.) 128, 332; Wellington v. Apthorp,
145 Mass. 69; Schmitt v. Missionary Society, 14 Stew. ris. But see Richardson v. Ortho
(Or. xgoi), 66 Pac. 925.
5Bolman v. Overman (x886), 8o Ala. 451.
3 Cf. Gates v. Gates (x898), 34 App. Div. 6oo, 54 N. Y. Supp. 454.
14 (1896), 113 Cal. 444; (1879). 35 Ark. 17.
35Rood, Wills. § 53, Note 18; Cf. Underhill, Wills, § 292, Note 3; Schouler, Wills,
§ 459. Note 6; also p. So6, Note i.
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-onfusion of contract and will influenced the decision. In the first
.ase an uncle made a parol contract with his niece to come "and live
with him and care for him," on condition that he would bequeath to
her all the property which he might own at his death. He married
before his death, his wife being ignorant of the contract. The court
said that this contract was not so "definite and certain and just" as
to call for specific performance. In arguing the question of public
policy the court said "this contract was not void as against public
policy at the time it was entered into." That is, a contract to will
all property to be held at death is not, as such, obnoxious to public
policy. But in the further argument of this point the court says,
"it must have been within the contemplation of the parties that Law-
rence IcNally should marry, for the contract could not have been
designed as a restraint on marriage, or-it would be void. If it was
within their contemplation, and the contract embraced the taking of
the deceased's entire estate to the- exclusion of any future wife or
child, then we have no hesitation in saying that the contract was
void as against public policy."
It should be noted, here that the "public policy" to which this con-
tract is obnoxious is not the-public policy which forbids the contract
to will all, but it is that familiar public policy which prohibits a con-
tract tending to act as a restraint on marriage.
The subsequent use of the decision in this- case by the California
court makes plainer its true meaning. The California, court says in
a later decision,386 "there is no question but that a: man- may make a
valid agreement binding himself to dispose of his property by last
will and testament in a: particular- way, and a court of equity will
under certain circumstances enforce such an- agreement," quoting in-
this connection: Owens v. McNally, supra. This court also held that
the former- adjudication87 against the enforcement of the contract by
the -uncle to will property to the niece, was not, a bar to the enforce-
ment. of the executed gift of land made to her by the uncle in. his
life time. The same court quotes the, original decision in Owens v.
McNally as authority for the, enforcement of a contract made, by an
intestate, entitling, a. claimant under this contract to all the property
remaining in the hands of the, administrator afte- paying the debts of
the deceased.-" In- the final stage of, this litigation- in regard to
Healy's-estate the court'held that, "if the deceased Matthew I-ealy,
for an adequate consideration, agreed to leaye a will upon his death.
by its terms giving all of his estate to the plaintiff, and he died without
"6'Russel %. Agar (08), 12; Cal. 398.
1TOwens v. McNally (1899), 124 Cal. 30; Cf. Owens v. McNally (x896). 113 Cal. 444.
39Estate of Healy (1902), 137 Cal. 478.
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leaving such a will; and, if plaintiff can not be placed in statu quo,
and the failure of the deceased, Healy, to leave the will as agreed
works a fraud upon the plaintiff, and the granting of equitable relief
to the plaintiff would not work a gross injustice upon innocent third
parties, then a court of equity will enforce Healy's agreement by
declaring his heirs constructive trustees of the title cast upon them
by reason of his dying intestate. '39 In a dissenting opinion to this last
case VAN Dyme, J., says that this case is distinguished in the majority
opinion, from the McNally case, by the "fact that McNally married
and Healy did not * * * and that though the court was right in
denying specific performance there, the contract should be specifically
enforced here."40
It is evident from an examination of these later California cases
that this court is in accord with the majority of other courts in hold-
ihg that a contract to will all is not as such contrary to public policy,
but may be specifically enforced, if as a contract it has in other
respects the characteristics which justify specific enforcement. In
a very recent California case 4" an agreement by the deceased to
convey "all the property of which she might die seised or possessed"
was upheld by the Supreme Court, although some of the property
had neither actual nor potential existence at the time of the agreement.
This practically leaves the Arkansas court42 alone in the statement
that "it is unreasonable and against public policy, that one should
be allowed by an irrevocable contract, * * * to denude himself
* * * of all he may afterwards acquire," and an examination
of this decision will show that owing to the facts of the case and the
peculiar basis upon which the argument of the court proceeded, the
case can hardly be taken as establishing the principle in the broad
form in which it is stated.
Abram- and Aaron Clark. two brothers, both unmarried, entered
into a mutual obligation under seal, of the following form: "Where-
fore the said Abram Clark, for the consideration hereinafter men-
tioned, hereby gives and grants to the said Aaron Clark, at the death
of the said Abram (should the said Abram die before the said
Aaron). all his property, real and personal, which he may now have,
or which he, the said Abram, may have at the time of his death, to
have and to hold the same to his heirs forever." Aaron on his part,
and in like language, conveyed all his intere§t present and prospective
'9McCabe v. Healy (1902), 138 Cal. 85.
oMcCabe v. Healy (19o2), 138 Cal. 96; Cf. Bell v. Vyman (i9o5), 147 Cal. 515.
4Stewart v. Smith (1907), 91 Pac. (Cal.) 670.
42 See Hershey v. Clark (1879). 35 Ark. 17.
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to Abram, in case the latter should survive. The instrument was
signed and sealed by the two parties, and attested by two witnesses,
but not in the form usually adopted in the attestation of wills.
Abram died first and Aaron took possession of the property. He
persuaded his mother to convey to him all her interest in Abram's
estate. When Aaron died he willed all his property, real and per-
sonal, to his mother and his sister Sarah. Sarah and her mother
later executed a joint will in proper form containing certain "be-
quests and devises" and bequeathing the balance of their property
to trustees for charitable purposes. The plaintiff claims as one of
the heirs of her brother Abram, and as heir and distributee of her
mother Nancy. The court said that "the joint instrument between
Abram and Aaron Clark, and the joint will of Nancy and Sarah
Clark, should both have been. disregarded." The reason assigned
for disregarding the joint will is that JARMAN, WILLS, Vol. I, p. 27,
says that "a joint or mutual will is said to be unknown to the testa-
mentary law of England" and cites Clayton v. Liverman.'8  It
should -be noted that the Arkansas case of Hershey v. Clark decides
two points, namely, that (I) "the joint instrument between Abram
and Aaron Clark and (2) the joint zuill of Nancy and Sarah Clark
should both have been disregarded." The first point is decided, on
the score of public policy.,, the second on the authority of Clayton v.
Liverman, and this double headed decision brushes aside both testa-
mentary instruments in favor of the intestate succession. The
majority decision in the case of Clayton v. Liverman is based on the
statement of Sir JoHN NIcHOLI. in Hobson v. Blackburn49 to the
effect that such an instrument [i. e. a mutual or conjoint will] "is
unknown to the testamentary law of this country."
'DANIEL, J., dissented from this opinioi and" in his argument says
that, the case of Hobson v. Blackburn simply lays down this prin-
ciple: "That mutual or conjoint wills irrevocable by either of the
suipposed testators is unknown to the testamentary law of this
country." Joshua Hobson and two of his sisters had made a mutual
will. Joshua died in 1794 and his sister Martha afterwards, in, i82o,
made a separate, will. The allegation, (propounding the will of
1794) proceeded: upon, the notion of the irrevocability of the instru-
ment which it propounded as the will of the deceased. Sir John
NIcHOLL presiding over the Prerogative Court said, "Why this. very
circumstance destroys its essence as, a will and converts it into a, con-
4S Sbpra, Note is. It should be noted that the court here quotes, from an old edition
of Jarman's Vills. The corresponding note in the, later. edition- shows the growth of the
modern doctrine.
49 x Addams, Eccles. Reports, 274.
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tract; a species of instrument over which this court has no jurisdic-
tion." But says Judge DANIEL, "The Court of Equity by its extraor-
dinary power might restrain the revocation, or declare a revocation
of it in the court of probate a nullity," and cites with approval the
opinion of Lord CAMDEN in Dtf our v. Pereira.50
This decision in Duffour v. Pereira is the leading case mentioned
above (Note i6) upon which the line of cases rests which hold to
the validity of joint instruments for the disposal of property after
death. Lord Camden's decision in this case is as follows: "It [the
mutual will] might have been revoked by both jointly; it might have
been revoked separately, provided the party intending it, had, given
notice to the other of such revocation. But I can not be of the
opinion that either of them, could during their joint lives, do it
secretly; or that after the death of either, it could be done by the
survivor by another will. It is a contract between the parties, which
can not be rescinded, but by the consent of both. The first that dies,
carries his part of the contract into execution. Will the Court after-
ward permit the other to break the contract? Certainly not."
In a recent North Carolina decision,5' the decision in Clayton v.
Liverman was reversed in the following words, "DANIEL, J., in his
able dissenting opinion combats the w~ole argument of the court
and insists that the court misapprehended the Judge's opinion in Hob-
son v. Blackburn, supra. On a close Treading of the case we think
the court did misconceive the question at issue in Hobson's case, and
we approve the conclusion in the dissenting opinion. As the question
was so ably discussed in Clayton v. Livernan, supra, we are not dis-
posed to repeat it, but only give the conclusion."
We have then this rather curious state of things in regard to the
relations of these several decisions:
Hershey v. Clark passed the property to the intestate claimant on
two grounds: (a) Because the joint instrument between the two
brothers was invalid; (-b) because the joint will of mother and
daughter was invalid. Now it should be noted that the second point
(b) was decided on the basis of Clayton v. Livermam. But Clayton
v. Liverman has been reversed in In re Sutton Daz& Will. In the
case of In re Suitton Davis Will, the North Caroliha court adopts in
tota the argument of the dissenting opinion in Clayton v. Liverman.
Furthermore this dissenting opinion presents the decision in Duffour
v. Pereira, which, in its turn, decides that a joint instrument for the
disposition of property after the death of the parties is: (a) A
contract between them which can not be rescinded except by the con-
rO Dickens Rep. 420. Cf. also Note z6.
51 In re Sutton Davis Will, xo N. C. 13.
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sent of both; (b) That the death of one of the parties carries his part
into execution and the court will not permit the other party after-
ward to break the contract.
If now a case should arise in Arkansas on a state of facts identical
with those in Hershey v. Clark, the Arkansas court, if it followed
the authority which it. adopted before, would .necessarily reverse
its findings as to the invalidity of the joint will of the mother and
daughter; and, furthermore, if it followed the reasoning of its
authority to the logical conclusion, it would also reverse its finding
on the first point, and declare the joint instrument between the
brothers Abram and Aaron Clark a good contract.
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